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Abstract
Recently, scholars from law and political science have introduced metrics which
use only election outcomes (and not district geometry) to assess the presence of
partisan gerrymandering. The most high-profile example of such a tool is the
efficiency gap. Some scholars have suggested that such tools should be sensitive
enough to alert us when two election outcomes have the same percentage of votes
going to political party A, but one of the two awards party A more seats. When
a metric is able to distinguish election outcomes in this way, that metric is said to
satisfy the efficiency principle.
In this article, we show that the efficiency gap fails to satisfy the efficiency prin-
ciple. We show precisely how the efficiency principle breaks down in the presence
of unequal voter turnout. To do this, we first present a construction that, given
any rationals 1/4 < V < 3/4 and 0 < S < 1, constructs an election outcome with
vote share V , seat share S, and EG = 0. (For instance, one party can get 26%
of the vote and anywhere from 1% to 99% of the seats while the efficiency gap
remains zero.) Then, for any election with vote share 1/4 < V < 3/4, seat share S,
and EG= 0, we express the ratio ρ of average turnout in districts party A lost to
average turnout in districts party A won as a function in only V and S. It is well
known that when all districts have equal turnout, EG can be expressed as a simple
formula in V and S; we express the efficiency gap of any election as an equation
only in V, S, and ρ. We also report on the values of ρ that can be observed in actual
elections.
1 Introduction
Gerrymandering is an issue that has had a long history in the American democracy. The
term “gerrymander” started with the 1812 redistricting of Massachusetts. In that year,
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Governor Elbridge Gerry participated in a redistricting that successfully kept Governor
Gerry’s Democratic-Republican party in power in the state senate.
In the 1812 redistricting of Massachusetts, the telltale sign that the redistricting effort
was intended to benefit one political party was the bizarre salamander shape of one of
the resulting districts (hence the name “Gerry-mander”). While the irregular shape
of districts has long been the focus of claims that districts have been gerrymandered,
deciding whether a shape is reasonable or not is surprisingly difficult. For example, one
could consider a district’s shape to be a problem if its boundary is too long, given the
contained area. But upon consideration of a state with a long coastline, or even the
fact that boundaries can become very irregular simply upon “zooming in” with a digital
map, this boundary to area ratio reveals its weakness as a tool to measure unfairness,
as M. Duchin and B. Tenner recently discuss in their preprint [8]. Indeed, this issue was
mentioned in Schwartzberg’s 1966 paper, when he emphasized using “gross perimeter,”
which is essentially a smoothing of the actual perimeter [34].
Another natural way to measure the irregularity of a district’s shape might be to
compare how it differs from a circle, square, or other desired shape. Or one could describe
how far a district’s shape is from being convex. But Young’s survey [39] easily illustrates
the fact that comparing district shapes to fixed shapes leads to shapes which are visual
oddities being scored as better than shapes like triangles or rectangles. And measuring
how far a shape is from being convex has its own shortcomings, as referenced in [11].
But perhaps even more important than the complication in measuring the oddities of
a district’s shape is the effect of modern technology on mapmaking. Modern mapmakers
can more readily make districting plans which satisfy reasonable shape requirements but
produce a range of partisan results. And thus a mapmaker can easily choose from among
those many maps the one which satisfies her political agenda.
Thus some have searched for a non-geometric tool that can measure how fair or unfair
a redistricting plan is in terms of its partisan effects. But in order to have a useful tool,
we must know exactly what that tool does and does not do. In this article we explore
the tool called the efficiency gap, and we study its behavior with respect to a criterion
for gerrymandering metrics called the efficiency principle. In Section 2 we define and
discuss the efficiency principle, dividing it into statements EP1 and EP2. We define the
efficiency gap in Section 3.1 and explore how the efficiency gap fails to satisfy EP1 in
Section 3.2 and EP2 in Section 3.3. We give a construction in section 3.4 which shows
shows that elections with EG=0 may still have a wild disproportion of seats to votes.
This construction leads us to study turnout ratios in Section 3.5, and we discuss the
implications of those ratios in Section 3.6. We give some brief final comments in Section
4.
2 The Efficiency Principle
We now set geometry aside and discuss tools designed to measure a partisan gerryman-
der based on election outcomes. In [13], McGhee introduced a property he called the
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“efficiency principle,” and Stephanopoulos and McGhee argued in [36] that this principle
is necessary for any such tool. Stephanopoulos and McGhee have a nice description of
the efficiency principle in [36]:
[The efficiency principle] states that a measure of partisan gerrymandering
“must indicate a greater advantage for (against) a party when the seat share
for that party increases (decreases) without any corresponding increase (de-
crease) in its vote share” [13]. The principle would be violated, for example,
if a party received 55% of the vote and 55% of the seats in one election, and
55% of the vote and 60% of the seats in another election, but a metric did
not shift in the party’s favor. The principle would also be violated if a party’s
vote share increased from 55% to 60%, its seat share stayed constant at 55%,
and a metric did not register a worsening in the party’s position.
First we note that, given the examples that Stephanopoulos and McGhee stated, their
intended definition of efficiency principle should instead read:
The efficiency principle states that a measure of partisan gerrymandering
must indicate both
EP1 a greater advantage for (against) a party when the seat share for that
party increases (decreases) without any corresponding increase (decrease)
in its vote share
EP2 and a greater advantage against (for) a party when the vote share in-
creases (decreases) without any corresponding increase (decrease) in the
seat share.
The efficiency principle can be stated more mathematically as follows: consider elec-
tion data consisting of a districting plan D and geographic distribution of votes ∆. Sup-
pose G(D,∆) is a function intended to measure partisan gerrymandering. Given D,∆,
G, and choice of party A, one can calculate
S(D,∆) = seat share for party A
V (∆) = vote share for party A
G(D,∆) = number such that a higher value means the districting plan is more favorable
to party A
Now the efficiency principle states:
EP1: If V (∆) = V (∆′) and S(D,∆) < S(D′,∆′) then we must have G(D,∆) < G(D′,∆′)
EP2: If V (∆) < V (∆′) and S(D,∆) = S(D′,∆′) then we must have G(D,∆) > G(D′,∆′)
Several political scientists and legal scholars believe that the efficiency principle is a
key requirement of a metric to measure partisan gerrymandering. In [36], Stephanopoulos
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and McGhee listed consistency with the efficiency principle as the first of four criteria
desired of any metric intended to measure partisan gerrymandering. They also point out
in [36] that McDonald and Best [12] and Gelman and King [9] also have made statements
supporting the importance of the efficiency principle. We note here that most of these
scholars seem to understand the efficiency principle as being what is listed as EP1 above.
We added EP2 purely based on the preceding quote from Stephanopoulos and McGhee
in [36].
Cover critiques the efficiency principle in [7] and suggests what he calls the Modified
Efficiency Principle. The Modified Efficiency Principle insists that EP1 must hold unless
the expected seat share changes under plausible variation in the vote share.
We do not take a position on the necessity of the efficiency principle, though we do
note that requiring it of a tool G may necessitate introducing bizarre shapes in order to
keep the value of G low. Indeed, suppose that G were a score satisfying the efficiency
principle, and consider two different states, both receiving 60% of the vote for party A,
but with one state having a very uniform distribution while the other is very clustered.
If the districting practices require keeping G below some threshold, then these states will
be required to find districting plans D,D′ which produce similar shares of representation.
This may necessitate completely different, and possibly visually offensive, shapes.
In Section 3.2 we will show that the efficiency gap fails both EP1 as well as Cover’s
Modified Efficiency Principle. In Section 3.3 we show that the efficiency gap fails EP2.
3 The Efficiency Gap
Here we study the efficiency gap, which is a metric Stephanopoulos and McGhee intro-
duced to measure partisan gerrymandering [35] and the metric we focus on in this article.
This metric was used to argue the presence of partisan gerrymandering in the Wisconsin
court case Whitford v. Gill [38] (later appealed to the Supreme Court), and has been
the subject of much debate since. (See, for example, [4, 36, 15, 5]). As we shall shortly
see, EG does not satisfy EP1, EP2, or the less stringent Modified Efficiency Principle.
The examples we will give involve uneven turnout between districts. All authors have
noted that for equal turnout the efficiency gap simplifies to the seat margin minus twice
the vote margin, and thus satisfies the efficiency principle (see, for example, the survey
[37]). Chambers, Miller, and Sobel seem to be aware that uneven turnout can break
down the efficiency principle for the efficiency gap; in a footnote in [5] they state “the
efficiency gap may fail to satisfy McGhee’s ‘efficiency principle’ when districts do not
have equal numbers of voters.” Cover also highlights the importance of turnout’s effect
on the efficiency gap in his discussion of the “turnout gap” in [7]. We note that McGhee
also states in [14] that “This [effect of turnout] is the opposite of what would be expected,
and a clear violation of the EP [efficiency principle].”1
1In the same paper, McGhee suggests redefining EG = S∗ − 2V ∗ where S∗ is the seat margin and
V ∗ is the vote margin. As mentioned above, this is what EG simplifies to when turnout in all districts
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In this section we will give explicit examples showing that the efficiency gap does not
satisfy the efficiency principle and we will show precisely how this failure to satisfy the
efficiency principle is related to turnout factors. But before we can do this, we must first
understand how to compute the efficiency gap. Throughout this section, we will assume
there are only two parties and will use V to denote party A’s vote share (its number of
votes as a proportion of the total) and S to denote party A’s seat share (its number of
seats won as a proportion of the total) in a given election.
3.1 Calculating the Efficiency Gap
The efficiency gap is based on the concept of a wasted vote. There are two kinds of
wasted votes: the losing vote and the surplus vote. I’ve made a losing vote for candidate
A if I voted for candidate A but candidate B won my district. And I’ve made a surplus
vote if already a majority of the population in my district voted for candidate A, and
I made yet another vote for candidate A on top of that. Both the losing vote and the
surplus vote don’t help my candidate get elected, so in either case my vote is wasted.
The efficiency gap subtracts the number of party A’s wasted votes from the number of
party B’s wasted votes, and then divides by the total number of votes.
More explicitly, suppose a state has n districts and let V Pi be the number of votes
for party P ∈ {A,B} in district i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Suppose that party A won districts
1, 2, . . . ,m and lost districts m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . , n. Then the efficiency gap is:
EG =
∑m
i=1
(
V Bi −
(
V Ai − V
A
i +V
B
i
2
))
+
∑n
j=m+1
((
V Bj −
V Bj +V
A
j
2
)
− V Aj
)
∑n
`=1 (V
A
` + V
B
` )
=
∑m
i=1
(
3
2
V Bi − 12V Ai
)
+
∑n
j=m+1
(
1
2
V Bj − 32V Aj
)∑n
`=1 (V
A
` + V
B
` )
(1)
Remark 1. The coefficients of 3
2
and 1
2
in equation (1) in effect cause the efficiency gap
to count losing votes three times as much as winning votes.
We note that Cover [7] and Nagle [15] have commented on the fact that the “surplus
vote” could also be calculated as simply the difference between the number of winning
votes and the number of losing votes (as opposed to half of that difference). This would
change the above remark to say that losing votes would be counted twice as much as
winning votes.2 Interestingly, the calculation of surplus votes seems to be part of Judge
Griesbach’s critique of the efficiency gap. In his dissenting opinion in Whitford v. Gill,
he states
is equal. This formula does nothing more or less than prescribing the seat share as a linear formula in
the vote share, and thus we believe the courts will find it unsatisfying.
2 We note that this new definition of surplus votes would have similar outcomes for the rest of this
article. The efficiency gap with this new definition of surplus votes would still not satisfy the efficiency
principle. Theorem 1 would be true with now 1/3 < V < 2/3, and Theorem 2 would have a different,
somewhat more extreme, ratio of turnout factors: S(3V−2)(S−1)(3V−1) .
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For example, if the Indians defeat the Cubs 8 to 2, any fan might say that
the Indians “wasted” 5 runs, because they only needed 3 to win yet scored 8.
Under the Plaintiff’s theory, however, the Indians needed 5 runs to beat the
Cubs that day: 4 runs to reach 50% of the total runs, plus one to win. That,
of course, is absurd.
Our constructions exploit the observations in Remark 1.
3.2 The Efficiency Gap Does Not Satisfy EP1
Through examples, we shall show the following:
Proposition 1. The efficiency gap does not satisfy EP1. That is, there exist two elec-
tion outcomes in which parties A and B receive the same proportion of the vote in both
elections, party A wins more districts in the second election, and yet the efficiency gap
of both elections is the same.
We prove this Proposition with the sample elections in Table 1.3
Election 1 Election 2
District Votes Wasted Votes Turnout Votes Wasted Votes Turnout
A B A B A B A B
1 48 52 48 2 100 72 78 72 3 150
2 48 52 48 2 100 72 78 72 3 150
3 48 52 48 2 100 72 78 72 3 150
4 48 52 48 2 100 72 78 72 3 150
5 48 52 48 2 100 52 48 2 48 100
6 52 48 2 48 100 52 48 2 48 100
7 52 48 2 48 100 52 48 2 48 100
8 52 48 2 48 100 52 48 2 48 100
9 52 48 2 48 100 52 48 2 48 100
10 52 48 2 48 100 52 48 2 48 100
Total 500 500 250 250 1000 600 600 300 300 1200
V 500/1000=50% 600/1200 = 50%
S 5/10=50% 6/10 = 60%
EG (250-250)/1000=0 (300-300)/1200=0
Table 1: The EG does not satisfy EP1
We can see that the average turnout in the districts that party A loses is 1.5 times
higher than the average turnout in the districts that party A wins. It is this lopsided
3We restrict our attention to examples with EG = 0, which suffices to prove our results. Examples
can be constructed with arbitrary fixed EG.
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turnout that allows the efficiency gap to be 0: party A has significantly more losing votes
in the districts it lost than party B does in the districts that it lost.
One might suggest that a factor of 1.5 in turnout difference is alarming, but we note
that this particular number (1.5) is not different from what is seen in practice. For
example, Tables 2 and 3 give the turnouts in the 2016 congressional election in Texas.
For simplicity, we count all votes in each district (even though some were for 3rd party
candidates).
District 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Turnout 260,409 278,236 316,467 246,220 192,875 273,296 255,533
District 8 10 11 12 13 14 17
Turnout 236,379 312,600 225,548 283,115 221,242 259,685 245,728
District 19 21 22 23 24 25 26
Turnout 203,475 356,031 305,543 228,965 275,635 310,196 319,080
District 27 31 32 36
Turnout 230,580 284,588 229,171 218,565
Table 2: Republican-won Districts in the 2016 Texas congressional election.
District 9 15 16 18 20 28 29
Turnout 188,523 177,479 175,229 204,308 187,669 184,442 131,982
District 30 33 34 35
Turnout 218,826 126,369 166,961 197,576
Table 3: Democrat-won Districts in the 2016 Texas congressional election.
Just glancing at Tables 2 and 3 we can see that the Republican-won districts have
higher turnouts in general. If we calculate the turnout ratio, we find that
average turnout in districts Republicans won
average turnout in districts Democrats won
=
262, 766.48
178, 124
≈ 1.475
which is quite close to 1.5.
For comparison, we have data (rounded to the nearest hundredth) from the 2016 U.S.
House of Representatives elections in all states with 8 or more congressional districts in
Table 4 [21, 22, 30, 23, 17, 10, 18, 31, 24, 32, 25, 26, 19, 16, 27, 28, 29, 33, 20, 2, 6]. In
this table, n, ρ and M/m are defined as follows:
n = number of districts in the state
ρ =
average turnout in districts Republicans won in the state
average turnout in districts Democrats won in the state
M/m =
maximum turnout in a single district in the state
minimum turnout in a single district in the state
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State AZ CA FL GA IL IN MD MA MI MN MO
n 9 53 27 14 18 9 8 9 14 8 8
ρ 1.42 1.11 1.07 0.99 1.14 1.18 1.08 0 1.11 1.08 1.10
M/m 2.15 4.41 1.62 1.55 2.06 1.42 1.18 1.34 1.47 1.19 1.34
State NJ NY NC OH PA TN TX VA WA WI
n 12 27 13 16 18 9 36 11 10 8
ρ 1.26 1.11 0.94 1.14 1.00 1.10 1.48 1.09 0.91 1.16
M/m 1.96 1.83 1.27 1.34 1.56 1.31 2.82 1.42 1.65 1.53
Table 4: Turnout ratios in all states with at least 8 congressional districts
It is important to note that some of this information may have confounding variables.
For example, in California and Washington the primary process allows for two candidates
of the same party to be the two candidates in the final election (which may, in turn, affect
turnout). Additionally, many of the states had third-party or write-in candidates. For
Table 4, we used the total turnout in our calculations (including third-party or write-in
candidates). Note that nearly all of the ratios ρ are larger than 1 (Massachusetts is
unusual in that it had no congressional seats won by Republicans).
We note that the example in Table 1 involved a state with a larger number of districts:
10. In general, as we shall see in section 3.5, pairs of elections can realistically be
constructed to fail EP1 when a state has a larger number of districts. This suggests
that the efficiency gap has concerning flaws when used for states with a larger number of
districts. In [4], Bernstein and Duchin also discuss the fact that the efficiency gap’s lack
of “granularity” make it problematic for states with few districts, and Stephanopoulos
and McGhee themselves only compiled historical data in their original paper from races
with at least 8 seats [35].
Finally, in Table 5, we give another example to show that the efficiency gap does not
satisfy Cover’s “modified efficiency principle” stated at the end of Section 2.
Tables 1 and 5 show that both close races and landslides can happen in pairs of elec-
tions having the same vote share, same efficiency gap, but different seat share. Since small
variation in vote share would not affect the expected seat share in elections from Table
5, we see that the efficiency gap does not satisfy Cover’s modified efficiency principle.
3.3 The Efficiency Gap Does Not Satisfy EP2
Proposition 2. The efficiency gap does not satisfy EP2. That is, there exist two elections
in which party A wins the same number of seats, party A wins a higher percentage of the
total vote in the second election, and yet the efficiency gaps of the two elections are both
equal.
This fact is proven by the examples in Table 6.
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Election 1 Election 2
District Votes Wasted Votes Turnout Votes Wasted Votes Turnout
A B A B A B A B
1 25 75 25 25 100 37 113 37 38 150
2 25 75 25 25 100 37 113 37 38 150
3 25 75 25 25 100 38 112 38 37 150
4 25 75 25 25 100 38 112 38 37 150
5 25 75 25 25 100 75 25 25 25 100
6 75 25 25 25 100 75 25 25 25 100
7 75 25 25 25 100 75 25 25 25 100
8 75 25 25 25 100 75 25 25 25 100
9 75 25 25 25 100 75 25 25 25 100
10 75 25 25 25 100 75 25 25 25 100
Total 500 500 250 250 1000 600 600 300 300 1200
V 500/1000=50% 600/1200 = 50%
S 5/10=50% 6/10 = 60%
EG (250-250)/1000=0 (300-300)/1200=0
Table 5: An Example Where Plausible Variation in Vote Share Does Not Affect Expected
Seat Share
3.4 The 1/4 Boundary for “Hidden” Gerrymandering
We previously saw an example showing that the efficiency gap fails EP1. Here, we shall
prove the following:
Theorem 1. For any rational numbers 1/4 < V < 3/4 and 0 < S < 1, there exists
election data with vote share V , seat share S, and EG = 0.
On the face of it, this Theorem is startling. It states that there exists an election
with V = 26%, S = 99%, and yet the efficiency gap is 0. We shall prove Theorem 1 by
constructing such an election outcome. Not surprisingly, this construction will produce
quite lopsided turnouts. Information on how lopsided the turnouts must be will be
presented in Section 3.5.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix S = m
n
and V and choose M large enough so that MV ≥ m
and M(1− V ) ≥ n−m. First, construct an election outcome in which party A has vote
share V and seat share S by distributing MV votes to party A and no votes to party B
in the m districts that party A wins, and M(1 − V ) votes to party B and no votes to
party A in the n−m districts that party A loses.
Now we adjust this election in a way so as to keep the vote share the same but make
the efficiency gap go to 0.
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Election 1 Election 2
District Votes Wasted Votes Turnout Votes Wasted Votes Turnout
A B A B A B A B
1 70 30 20 30 100 75 25 25 25 100
2 60 10 25 10 70 75 25 25 25 100
3 30 100 30 35 130 25 75 25 25 100
Totals 160 140 75 75 300 175 125 75 75 300
V 160/300 ≈ 53% 175/300 ≈ 58%
S 2/3 ≈ 67% 2/3 ≈ 67%
EG (75-75)/300=0 (75-75)/300=0
Table 6: Party A Wins the Same Districts in Both Elections, about 53% of Votes in
Election 1, about 58% of Votes in Election 2, and EG=0 in Both Elections
Case 1: 1/4 < V ≤ 1/2. Note that before any adjustment has been made, party A
has MV/2 wasted votes and party B has M(1 − V )2 wasted votes. Note that M(1 −
V )/2 ≥MV/2.
We adjust the election by distributing NV votes to party A and N(1 − V ) votes to
party B in only the districts where party A is losing, where N is a positive number.
The remaining election still has vote proportion V and seat proportion S. But now,
since 1/4 < V , the total count of wasted votes for party A has gone up more than
the total count of wasted votes for party B. More specifically, we know that party A’s
wasted vote count has gone up by NV , while party B’s wasted vote count has gone up
by 1
2
N(1− V )− 1
2
NV . The net count of wasted votes for party A increases so long as
NV >
1
2
N(1− V )− 1
2
NV
V >
1
4
Now, by choosing N appropriately, we can make the total number of wasted votes for
party A to be the same as the total number of wasted votes for party B. Thus, we can
get the efficiency gap to go to 0.
Case 2: 1/2 ≤ V < 3/4 In this case, we can simply exchange the roles of party A
and party B, and we are back in Case 1.
Let’s see how this construction plays out in an extreme case. Specifically, the case of
party A receiving 27% of the vote and winning 9 out of 10 congressional seats. If one
follows this construction, the resulting outcome is in Table 7.
Obviously, the difference in turnout is extreme, but the fact that it is even possible
to construct an example such as the one in Table 7 is notable.
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District Votes Wasted Votes Turnout
A B A B
1 155 492 155 168.5 647
2 3 0 1.5 0 3
3 3 0 1.5 0 3
4 3 0 1.5 0 3
5 3 0 1.5 0 3
6 3 0 1.5 0 3
7 3 0 1.5 0 3
8 3 0 1.5 0 3
9 3 0 1.5 0 3
10 3 0 1.5 0 3
Total 182 492 168.5 168.5 674
V 182/674=27%
S 9/10=90%
EG (168.5-168.5)/674=0
Table 7: V = 27%, S = 90%, and EG = 0
3.5 Turnout Factors
In Election 2 in Tables 1 and 5, we saw election outcomes having an efficiency gap of 0
where A received half the votes but more than half the seats. And in the election from
Table 7, we say party A winning 9/10 of the seats with 27% of the vote and efficiency
gap of 0. For each of these examples, the turnout was higher in districts where A lost
than in districts where A won. Interestingly, the mathematics of election outcomes with
0 efficiency gap tells us precisely how lopsided such elections will be. Define turnout ratio
ρ as follows:
ρ =
average turnout in districts party A lost
average turnout in districts party A won
We have the following.
Theorem 2. Fix rational numbers 1/4 < V < 3/4 and 0 < S < 1. Consider an election
with vote share V , seat share S, and EG=0. (We know that such an election exists from
Theorem 1). Then
ρ =
S(3− 4V )
(1− S)(4V − 1)
Upon inspection, this is a mathematically intuitive result in that ρ goes to 0 if either
V goes to 3/4 or S goes to 0, and ρ goes to infinity if either V goes to 1/4 or S goes to
1. However, it may be surprising that this turnout ratio is an expression only in S and
V .
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Before proving Theorem 2, we must first prove that the set of election outcomes under
consideration is a convex cone. For the reader not familiar with vector spaces, see, for
example, [1], and for the reader not familiar with convex cones, see, for example, chapter
II of [3].
Suppose the number of districts is n and fix an integer m with 1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1. We’d
like to look at the set E of all election outcomes where party A wins m districts and
EG=0 (thus here we have S = m
n
). Without loss of generality, we can assume that party
A wins the districts labeled 1, 2, . . . ,m and loses the districts labeled m+1,m+2, . . . , n.
Each election outcome can be written as a vector (a1, a2, . . . , an, b1, b2, . . . , bn) where ai
gives the number of votes for party A in district i and bi gives the number of votes for
party B in district i. Then we can see that E is the set of all vectors in Z2n satisfying
the following:
ai ≥ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . , n
bi ≥ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . , n
ai ≥ bi i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
bi ≥ ai i = m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . , n
m∑
i=1
bi +
n∑
i=m+1
(
bi − ai + bi
2
)
=
n∑
i=m+1
ai +
m∑
i=1
(
ai − ai + bi
2
)
Note that the inequalities state that the number of votes is non-negative and that party
A wins districts 1, 2, . . . ,m and loses districts m + 1,m + 2, . . . , n.4 The equality states
that EG=0.
For ease, we need to introduce some notation. Let αi denote the vector indicating a
vote of 1 for party A in district i and votes of 0 everywhere else. Let βi denote the vector
indicating a vote of 1 for party B in district i and votes of 0 everywhere else. That is, if
ei ∈ R2n denotes the ith standard basis vector, then
αi = ei
βi = en+i
We shall first prove the following:
Claim 1. Every vector in E can written as a non-negative integer combination of vectors
of one of the following forms:
αi + αj + αk + βi for i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} (2)
βi + βj + βk + αi for i, j, k ∈ {m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . , n} (3)
αi + βj for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . , n} (4)
αi + βi + αj + βj for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . , n} (5)
4Since we state the inequality ai ≥ bi for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m not as strict inequalities, we view an outcome
of ai = bi as being the case where both parties get the same number of votes but after drawing a name
out of a bowl (or whatever other electoral procedure) party A won the district. We similarly interpret
the cases where bj = aj , j = m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . , n.
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The reader will notice that we exploit Remark 1 in our proof.
Proof of Claim 1. We proceed with proof by contradiction. Suppose our Claim were
false, and there existed a vector in E which could not be written as a non-negative
integer combination of vectors of type (2), (3), (4), and (5). Since all of the vectors in E
have positive integer coordinates, we can find one such vector such that the sum of that
vector’s coordinates is minimized. That is,  = (a1, a2, . . . , an, b1, b2, . . . , bn) ∈ E ⊂ Z2n
is chosen such that
n∑
i=1
(ai + bi)
is minimized. Certainly  6= ~0 because ~0 is a non-negative integer combination of the
above vectors (the linear combination with all coefficients 0). Thus,  has a positive
coordinate.
Case 1:  has positive coordinates corresponding to losing votes, but only
for party B. In this case, the only place where party A can have wasted votes is with
surplus votes. Party A must firstly win the district in which B has a losing vote, and
since EG=0 for election , party A must have at least 2 surplus votes. Thus, we can find
i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} for which
− (αi + αj + αk + βi) ∈ E
contradicting that  was the element in E with smallest sum of coordinates which could
not be written as a non-negative integer combination of the above vectors.
Case 2:  has positive coordinates corresponding to losing votes, but only
for party A. By the same argument as in case 1, we find a contradiction.
Case 3: both parties A and B have a losing vote. In this case, we can find an
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . , n} such that
− (αi + βi + αj + βj) ∈ E
again contradicting that  was the element in E with smallest sum of coordinates which
could not be written as a non-negative integer combination of the above vectors.
Case 4:  does not have any positive coordinates which are losing votes.
Here,  only has positive coordinates which are winning votes. Again, since EG=0 for
election , there is some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . , n} for which
− (αi + βj) ∈ E
again contradicting that  was the element in E with smallest sum of coordinates which
could not be written as a non-negative integer combination of the above vectors.
We have exhausted all cases, and thus we must conclude that Claim 1 is true.
Note that Claim 1 allows us to see an alternate proof of Theorem 1. Suppose we
want to find an election outcome with EG=0 in which party A has seat share S = m
n
and
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vote share V . By Claim 1, we need only form a non-negative integer combination of the
vectors in equations (2), (3), (4), and (5) with the additional constraint that
n∑
i=1
ai = V
(
n∑
i=1
(ai + bi)
)
Upon inspection of the proportion of votes given to each party in equations (2), (3),
(4), and (5), this can be achieved nontrivially (meaning without any districts with a tie
between parties A and B) so long as 1/4 < V < 3/4.
With Claim 1 in hand, we can now prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider an election in which party A has vote share 1/4 < V < 3/4
and seat share S = m
n
(winning m seats) and EG=0. From Claim 1 we know that this
election is a non-negative integer combination of vectors of types (2), (3), (4), and (5).
Case 1: 1/4 < V ≤ 1/2. First we suppose the election under consideration is a
non-negative integer combination only of vectors of types (2) and (3). Let k2 be the sum
of the coefficients of vectors of type (2) and k3 be the sum of the coefficients of vectors
of type (3) in that conic combination. Then, to satisfy these constraints, we must have
3k2 + k3 = TV
k2 + 3k3 = T (1− V )
where T is the total turnout. Solving this pair of linear inequalities for k2 and k3 gives
k2 =
1
8
T (4V − 1)
k3 =
1
8
T (3− 4V )
With these coefficients, the districts where party A wins will get a total of 4k2 votes and
the districts where party A loses will get a total of 4k3 votes. Thus we calculate:
ρ =
4k3
(n−m)
4k2
m
=
m1
2
T (3− 4V )
(n−m)1
2
T (4V − 1) =
S(3− 4V )
(1− S)(4V − 1)
which is the statement of Theorem 2.
Now suppose instead our election is a non-negative integer combination only vectors
of type (3) and (4), and k3 is the sum of the coefficients of vectors of type (3) and k4
is the sum of the coefficients of vectors of type (4). To satisfy our election constraints
(again assuming our election has V total votes) we have
k3 + k4 = TV
3k3 + k4 = T (1− V )
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Solving this pair of linear inequalities for k3 and k4 gives
k3 =
1
2
T (1− 2V )
k4 =
1
2
T (4V − 1)
In this case the districts where party A wins will get a total of k4 votes and the districts
where party A loses get a total of 4k3 + k4 votes. Thus we calculate:
ρ =
4k3+k4
n−m
k4
m
=
m
(
2T (1− 2V ) + 1
2
T (4V − 1))
(n−m)1
2
T (4V − 1) =
m
(
3
2
− 2V )
(n−m)(2V − 1
2
)
=
S(3− 4V )
(1− S)(4V − 1)
which is again the same.
Since V ≤ 1/2, any non-negative integer combination of vectors of type (2), (3), and
(4) giving a proportion of votes V to party A can be separated into a sum of vectors of
types (2) and (3) giving a proportion of votes V to party A and another sum of vectors
of types (3) and (4) also giving a proportion of votes V to party A. Finally, note that
the distribution of votes among parties A and B is the same using vectors of the form
(4) and (5). Thus, any election with EG=0, vote share V and seat share S = m
n
must
have turnout ratio ρ = S(3−4V )
(1−S)(4V−1) .
Case 2: 1/2 < V < 3/4. Note that party B’s seat share is 1 − S and vote share is
1−V with 1/4 < 1−V < 1/2. Thus, putting party B in the role of party A in Theorem
2, we can use what we’ve already proved to get
ρ =
average turnout in districts party A lost
average turnout in districts party A won
=
(
average turnout in districts party B lost
average turnout in districts party B won
)−1
=
(
(1− S)(3− 4(1− V ))
(1− (1− S))(4(1− V )− 1)
)−1
=
S(3− 4V )
(1− S)(4V − 1)
Thus Theorem 2 is proved.5
5We note that Theorem 2 is still true for the boundary cases V = 1/4 and V = 3/4. If V = 1/4, this
would correspond to an election where all of the districts that party A wins have NO voter turnout (0
votes for both parties) and after pulling a name out of a bowl (or other electoral procedure), the seat is
given to party A. The districts where Party A loses have 25% of the vote to party A and 75% to party
B. In this election, the turnout factor from Theorem 2 would be infinite, which is appropriate given the
fact that there is 0 voter turnout in the districts that party A wins.
If V = 3/4, this would correspond to an election where all of the districts that party A loses have no
voter turnout and after pulling a name out of a bowl (or other electoral procedure), the seat is given to
party B. The districts where Party A wins have 75% of the vote to party A and 25% to party B. In
this election, the turnout factor from Theorem 2 would be 0, which is again appropriate given the fact
that there is 0 voter turnout in the districts which party A lost.
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3.6 Implications of Theorem 2
Recall that we define average turnout in districts A lost
average turnout in districts A won
= ρ and when 1/4 < V < 3/4 and EG=0
we have
ρ =
S(3− 4V )
(1− S)(4V − 1)
Solving this equation for S we have
S =
ρ(4V − 1)
ρ(4V − 1) + 3− 4V (6)
This equation gives the EG-preferred seat share when the vote share is 1/4 < V < 3/4
and the turnout ratio is ρ.
Example 1. Recall that in Tables 2 and 3, we saw that in the 2016 Texas congressional
elections,
average turnout in districts Republicans won
average turnout in districts Democrats won
=
262, 766.48
178, 124
≈ 1.475
We can see that the turnout ratio in our Texas example skews the efficiency gap in favor
of the Democrats. Letting Party A be the Democratic party, when the vote share is 50%,
the EG-preferred Democratic seat share for this Texas election is
S =
ρ(4V − 1)
ρ(4V − 1) + 3− 4V =
1.475(4(0.5)− 1)
4(0.5)(1.475− 1) + 3− 1.475 ≈ 60%
(If the turnout in each district were equal, when the vote share is 50% the EG-preferred
seat share would also be 50%).
The upshot of equation (6) is: while holding other factors equal, the more strongly
that party A obtains lower turnout in districts it wins than in districts it loses, the more
strongly EG reports a gerrymander favoring party B. We can also see this with graphs
of the EG-preferred S given in equation (6). These can be seen in Figure 1.
Note that, as ρ increases to infinity, EG=0 requires party A to receives nearly all
of the seats no matter their votes. As ρ decreases to 0, the efficiency gap only thinks
that an election outcome is “perfectly fair” if party A receives almost no seats. Also, as
expected, the function for S breaks down (gives values less than 0 or larger than 1) when
V < .25 or V > .75.
We can show that the efficiency gap can be calculated only as a function in S, V , and
ρ:
Theorem 3. Consider an election with seat share S, vote share V , and turnout ratio ρ.
Then the efficiency gap of this election is
EG = S∗ − 2V ∗ + S(1− S)(1− ρ)
S(1− ρ) + ρ
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Figure 1: Graphs of EG-preferred S as a function in V , for varying values of ρ.
where S∗ = S − 1
2
is the seat margin and V ∗ = V − 1
2
is the vote margin.6
Proof. The proof uses Cover’s expression of EG using the “turnout gap” [7]. Suppose
there are n districts with party A winning districts 1, 2, . . . ,m and party B winning
districts m + 1,m + 2, . . . , n. Let Ti be the turnout in district i and let TP be the
total turnout in districts that party P wins, P ∈ {A,B} so that TA =
∑m
i=1 Ti and
TB =
∑n
j=m+1 Tj. In the section on the Turnout Gap in [7], Cover shows:
EG = S∗ − 2V ∗ + S
(
TA
m
TA+TB
n
− 1
)
First suppose that S 6= 1. A little algebra (recalling that S = m
n
, 1 − S = n−m
n
, and
6Theorem 3 gives another proof of Theorem 2, by setting EG=0. We keep the proof in section 3.5
because it can be generalized to a different formulation of the efficiency gap, as in footnote 2.
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ρ = mTB
(n−m)TA ) gives:
EG = S∗ − 2V ∗ + S
( TA+TBn
TA
m
)−1
− 1

= S∗ − 2V ∗ + S
(S + TBn
TA
m
)−1
− 1

= S∗ − 2V ∗ + S
1− S
((
S
1− S + ρ
)−1
− 1 + S
)
= S∗ − 2V ∗ + S(1− S)(1− ρ)
S(1− ρ) + ρ
Finally, note that if S = 1 then TB = 0 and m = n so that Cover’s equation gives
EG = S∗ − 2V ∗. Thus the Theorem is proved.
We can see that EG = S∗−2V ∗ only when ρ = 1, S = 0, or S = 1. Recall that ρ = 1
when the average turnout in a district that A lost is the same as the average turnout in
a district that A won. Thus, the result that EG = S∗− 2V ∗ exactly when ρ = 1 slightly
generalizes the fact that EG = S∗ − 2V ∗ when turnout in each district is the same[4],
and is a re-wording of the result that EG = S∗ − 2V ∗ exactly when average turnout in
districts that party A won is the same as the overall average turnout[7]. Theorem 3 gives
the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Suppose ρ is fixed. Then the efficiency gap satisfies the efficiency principle.
Proof. We can see this by calculating that the partial derivative of EG with respect to
S is
ρ
(S(1− ρ) + ρ)2
which is positive, showing that the EG satisfies EP1. The partial derivative of EG with
respect to V is -2 (which is negative), showing that it satisfies EP2.
4 Additional Comments
It is well-known that there are various factors affecting voter turnout, including voter
ID laws, the availability of conveniences like early voting and vote-by-mail, electoral
competitiveness, voter demographics, and even the weather. It is equally well-known
that Hispanic voters have a considerably lower proportion of citizen voting age population
(CVAP) per Census population than most other subgroups, and that in recent elections
they tend to favor the Democratic party. This very likely accounts for lower turnout in
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Democrat-won districts, and correspondingly large values of ρ, for Texas and Arizona in
particular.
Given that lopsided turnout among different districts within a state is not uncom-
mon (see Table 4), it is important to know how our tools intended to measure partisan
gerrymandering are affected by voter turnout. We have shown that unequal turnout
among districts causes EG to “expect” an exaggerated seat bonus for the party with
lower turnout in the districts that it wins, which as we have seen is currently most often
the Democratic party.
The results given here suggest that additional care should be taken when interpreting
the numerical values of the efficiency gap. We strongly caution against using a fixed
numerical cutoff such as |EG| > .08 for detecting gerrymanders, and we argue that
values of EG should not be compared from one state to another or between different
historical periods because of the confounding effects of turnout ratios.
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